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Abstract1 
What does transitional justice require if it seeks to achieve justice in periods of radical 
change from oppressive regimes and violent conflict to peaceful democracies? The 
examination of pretransitional injustice typically reveals law’s instrumentality and its 
pathological effects, namely those caused not only by violations of civil-political human rights 
but also by violations of socioeconomic human rights. A normative shift is therefore the key 
to legitimizing the new dispensation. Yet, given law’s complicity in past injustice, a normative 
shift is only possible on the basis of law’s own rehabilitation. Therefore, law’s normative 
integrity can only be recovered through a substantive rehabilitation of victims’ capabilities 
negatively affected by previous human rights violations, especially violations of 
socioeconomic rights. With their capabilities restored, victims of historical injustice will be 
able to participate in the operations of transitional justice and to function as equal citizens in 
the new dispensation. Accordingly, the imperative of participation based on human rights to 
socioeconomic capabilities is at the heart of this reconceptualization of transitional justice.  
Keywords:  human rights, capability rights, victims/survivors, structural inequalities, 
transformative justice   
                                                          
1
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Introduction 
What we are inheriting is not just inequality, but a system of structured inequality, and one 
brought about by deliberate state policy. Removing the barriers to equal participation … is a 
national task requiring active steps by all of us. 
 – Albie Sachs2 
 
Authoritarian regimes and violent conflict are typically associated with political 
disenfranchisement, social discrimination and economic deprivation, largely engineered by 
law. 3  The resulting structural disadvantage leads to effective disempowerment, thereby 
making it extremely difficult for the affected population to open the door to change. 
Socioeconomic disadvantage tends to be reproduced, if not accumulated, over generations. 
The current primary focus of transitional justice on physical integrity rights and its 
neglect of economic, social and cultural rights underestimates the entrenched 
socioeconomic deprivation of victims manufactured by previous regimes.4 While transitional 
justice scholars increasingly argue in favour of economic, social and cultural rights being 
taken into account,5 the terrain of transitional justice is still contested in this respect.6 Victims 
                                                          
2
  Albie Sachs, Advancing Human Rights in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992), 141. 
3
  See, e.g., the overview of apartheid legislation in South Africa at South African History Online, ‘Apartheid 
Legislation 1850s-1970s,’ http://www.sahistory.org.za/politics-and-society/apartheid-legislation-1850s-1970s 
(accessed 24 November 2014); John Dugard, ‘The Legal Framework of Apartheid,’ in South African Dialogue: 
Contrasts in South African Thinking on Basic Race Issues, ed. Nicolaas J. Rhoodie (Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill, 
1972). For the laws of the Nazi regime in Germany, see, Michael Stolleis, The Law under the Swastika: Studies 
on Legal History in Nazi Germany, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
4
  For an early critique, see, Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). For a comparison of the limitations of the dominant transitional justice paradigm 
as regards the transitions in South Africa (1994) and Northern Ireland (1998), see, Thomas Bundschuh, ‘Justice, 
Truth and Capabilities: Towards a New Architecture of Transitional Justice including Socio-Economic Rights’ 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Ulster, 2009). As Makau Mutua notes, ‘the human rights movement’s primary 
grounding and bias towards civil and political rights … is one of its major weaknesses in the African post-colonial 
context.’ Makau Mutua, ‘A Critique of Rights in Transitional Justice: The African Experience,’ in Rethinking 
Transitions: Equality and Social Justice in Societies Emerging from Conflict, ed. Gaby Oré Aguilar and Felipe 
Gómez Isa (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011), 36.  
5
   Louise Arbour, 'Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition,’ New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 40(1) (2007): 1-14; Lisa J. Laplante, 'Transitional Justice and Peace Building: 
Diagnosing and Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework,’ 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2(3) (2008): 331-355; Zinaida Miller, 'Effects of Invisibility: In Search 
of the “Economic” in Transitional Justice,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 2(3) (2008): 266-291; 
Ismael Muvingi, 'Sitting on Powder Kegs: Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional Societies,’ International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 3(2) (2009): 163-182. 
6
  Lars Waldorf, 'Anticipating the Past,’ Social and Legal Studies 21(2) (2012): 171-186; Frank Haldermann and 
Rachelle Kouassi, ‘Transitional Justice without Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?’ in Economic, Social, and 
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of past socioeconomic injustice do not benefit much from the prevailing conceptualization of 
transitional justice. Structural disadvantage and disparities generated by previous 
authoritarian regimes and violent conflict persist. The protracted legacies of South Africa’s 
apartheid, slavery in the US and the continuing plight of Aboriginal peoples in Australia 
illustrate this point. It has been noted that in South Africa ‘apartheid characteristics are [still] 
entrenched in the labour market.’ 7 This is to say,  
Unemployment within race groups remains extremely high for both the African and 
coloured groups, at 29 per cent and 22.6 per cent respectively, and much lower for 
the Indian and white groups, at 11.5 per cent and 5 per cent respectively.8  
 
Black South Africans have a life expectancy of 45 years, while white people have the 
prospect of living to the age of 74 on average. 9 These figures are in keeping with the 
observations of Murray Leibbrandt and his colleagues, who state, ‘We see clear poverty 
dominance across population groups in the order of African, Coloured, Indian/Asian and 
White. This shows that the legacy of Apartheid is strongly persistent even in 2008.’10 
Consider the legacy of slavery in the US. As Kyle Logue notes,  
blacks as a group lag behind whites in every meaningful measure of social and 
economic well-being: income, wealth, housing, education, employment, health, life 
expectancy, and even subjective assessments of individual happiness. (…) Much of 
the inequality between blacks and whites involves children. Black children, for 
example, are more likely to die as infants, more likely to be born into poverty, more 
likely to be uninsured, more likely to be abused or neglected, and more likely to drop 
out of school than white children.11  
 
Logue asks, ‘If some combination of slavery, Jim Crow, and current discrimination is not the 
explanation, then what is?’12  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Cultural Rights In International Law, ed. Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
7
  Jan Hofmeyr, ed., Transformation Audit 2011: From Inequality to Inclusive Growth – South Africa's Pursuit of 
Shared Prosperity in Extraordinary Times (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2011), 31. For a 
history of inequality and its legacy in contemporary South Africa, see, Sampie Terreblanche, A History of 
Inequality in South Africa, 1652–2002 (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2002).  
8
  Hofmeyr, supra n 7 at 31.  
9
  Ibid. 
10
   Murray Leibbrandt, Ingrid Woolard, Arden Finn and Jonathan Argent, ‘Trends in South African Income 
Distribution and Poverty since the Fall of Apartheid,’ OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper 
No. 101 (2010), 42. As a result, 21 percent of African children reported hunger in 2008, compared to 3 percent of 
white children. See, Statistics South Africa, Social Profile of South Africa, 2002–2012: Social Profile of Vulnerable 
Groups, 2002–2012 (2013), fig. 2.15.  
11
   Kyle D. Logue, 'Reparations as Redistribution,' Boston University Law Review 84(5) (2004): 1348-1352. 
12
   Ibid., 1352-1353. 
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Note further the health inequality experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples in comparison to the rest of the population in Australia: 
In the period 2000–2002, babies of Indigenous mothers continued to be twice as 
likely to be of low birth weight as babies born to non-Indigenous mothers (13% 
compared to 6%).13  
 
In this context, a rethinking of transitional justice is required that will enable the field 
to take enduring legacies of injustice into account. As law was utilized to preserve privileges, 
thereby generating systemic deprivation leading to disempowerment, law not only needs to 
change formally but also to contribute to transformation in substance. At the core of this 
change is the imperative of participation. A focus on the empowerment of victims affected by 
law’s pathology is needed. Two reparative trajectories have to be put in motion at the same 
time: law has to be rehabilitated (the first trajectory) by initiating and creating the conditions 
for the rehabilitation of victims (the second trajectory), namely victims affected by economic, 
social and political structural disempowerment. The measure of such enabling transitional 
justice is the degree and scope of enabled participation, including a response to violations of 
socioeconomic rights. This article suggests that an enabling transitional justice framework is 
best achieved by starting with a conceptualization of human rights based on the capability 
approach advanced by Amartya Sen14 and expanded by Martha Nussbaum.15  
This article proceeds as follows. First, the capability approach as a basis for human 
rights is explored. The capability approach to human rights reveals the structural 
transformation necessary for the realization of human rights. Second, the article develops 
the concept of capability rights as rights to participatory capabilities. The ‘agent-rooted’ 
dimension of participatory capabilities has one goal, namely the repair and expansion of 
capabilities necessary to function as equal citizens. Third, the implications of these concepts 
for the current paradigm of transitional justice are examined. ‘De-clustering’ of multiple 
                                                          
13
   Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, A Statistical Overview of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Peoples in Australia (August 2006).  
14
   Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Allen Lane, 2009); Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
15
  Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2011); Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, 
Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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disadvantages represents an important instantiation of transitional justice, opening the way 
to transcend structural exclusion and to create the socioeconomic conditions for participation 
in the new dispensation. Fourth, critical elements of a new architecture of transitional justice 
are offered. The restoration of rights subjectivity of victims of historical injustice, including 
violations of socioeconomic rights, largely depends on the transformation of unjust, rights-
affecting pretransitional structures. The repair and realization of rights to socioeconomic 
capabilities, allowing victims to be able to be and to do what they have reason to value, will 
indicate the effectiveness of justice in transition. 
 
Human Rights as Capability Rights 
By asking the fundamental question ‘What is each person able to do and to be?’ the 
capability approach is ‘concerned with entrenched social injustice and inequality.’16 This is 
particularly relevant in transitional contexts where so-called capability failures emerge as ‘the 
result of discrimination and marginalization.’17 Hence the task of governments, as Nussbaum 
notes, to promote ‘a set of opportunities, or substantial freedoms, which people then may or 
may not exercise in action.’18 Capabilities are substantial freedoms that ‘a person actually 
has to do this or be that – things that he or she may value doing or being.’19 As Sen writes, 
‘the capability perspective does point to the central relevance of the inequality of capabilities 
in the assessment of social disparities’ 20  – the latter all too often being a feature of 
transitional societies. Capabilities can concern the ability to live a healthy life of normal 
length or the ability to reason in a way that is informed by an adequate education.21 It is 
however important to keep in mind that these capabilities ‘are not just abilities residing inside 
a person but also freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities 
                                                          
16
   Nussbaum, 2011, supra n 15 at 18-19. 
17
   Ibid., 19. Furthermore, as Martha Nussbaum points out, the capability approach has these characteristics: 
each person is taken as an end, a focus on choice or freedom and a pluralist nature regarding values. Ibid., 18. 
18
   Ibid., 18. 
19
   Sen, 2009, supra n 14 at 231-232. 
20
   Ibid., 232. 
21
   Cf. Nussbaum, 2011, supra n 15. 
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and the political, social, and economic environment.’22 Referring to this kind of necessary 
environment, Sen distinguishes five types of ‘instrumental freedoms that tend to contribute to 
the general capability of a person to live more freely’: 23  political freedoms, economic 
facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective freedoms.24 
Sen asks the question, ‘Can human rights be seen as entitlements to certain basic 
capabilities, and will this be a good way of thinking about human rights?’25 According to Sen, 
it can be argued ‘that human rights are best seen as rights to certain specific freedoms,’ 
whereas ‘capabilities can be seen, broadly, as freedoms of particular kinds.’26 Human rights 
can indeed be regarded as entitlements to certain basic capabilities. As Sen confirms, ‘the 
two concepts – human rights and capabilities – go well with each other, so long as we do not 
try to subsume either entirely with the other.’ 27  Harry Brighouse captures the relation 
between rights and capabilities best when he suggests ‘think[ing] of capabilities as the bases 
of rights claims.’28 As Brighouse explains,  
If someone claims that there is a fundamental right to X, it is incumbent on them to 
justify it; and justification will proceed by showing how the right to X is required to 
serve some capability. If there is no capability that it serves, then it is not a 
fundamental right.29 
 
Nussbaum has introduced her own approach to human rights and capabilities. She 
agrees with Sen as far as the complementarity of the two concepts is concerned.30 Referring 
to the right to political participation, the right to the free exercise of religion and the right to 
free speech, she emphasizes that ‘these and others [rights] are all best thought of as 
secured to people only when the relevant capabilities to function are present.’31 Nussbaum 
                                                          
22
   Ibid., 20. 
23
   Sen, 1999, supra n 14 at 38. 
24
   Ibid. 
25
   Amartya Sen, 'Human Rights and Capabilities,’ Journal of Human Development 6(2) (2005): 152.  
26
   Ibid., 152. 
27
   Sen, supra n 25 at 163. 
28
   Harry Brighouse, Justice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 80. 
29
   Ibid., 80. 
30
   Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Capabilities and Human Rights,’ Fordham Law Review 66(2) (1997): 273-300. 
31
   Ibid., 287.  
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sees human rights as ‘combined capabilities to function in various ways.’ 32  Combined 
capabilities ‘will usually involve both an internal component – a basic human functioning – 
and an external component’,33 i.e., ‘suitable external conditions for the [development34 or] 
exercise of the function.’35 It is worth noting that, as Nussbaum asserts, ‘the [capability] 
approach stresses the interdependency of liberties and economic arrangements.’ 36  She 
argues that basic liberties, which are all defined as abilities to do something, ‘have not been 
secured to people if, because of economic or educational deprivation, people are unable 
actually to function in accordance with the liberties that are guaranteed to them on paper.’37 
The synthesis of these convergent lines of thought opens the way to conceive 
capability rights as justified claims to secure both basic human functionings and the 
necessary external instrumental freedoms (Figure 1). Importantly, it is in interaction with 
instrumental freedoms that potential human functionings are developed (e.g., the ability to 
read) and realized (e.g., by reading a book). Through such actualization, potential 
functionings become achieved functionings. 
  
                                                          
32
   Ibid., 292. 
33
    Ibid., 293 
34
   Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings,' in Women, Culture, and Development, 
ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Nussbaum affirms, ‘We believe 
that certain basic and central human endowments have a claim to be assisted in developing, and exert that claim 
on others, and especially, as Aristotle saw, on government.’ Ibid., 88. 
35
   Nussbaum, supra n 30 at 290. 
36
  Nussbaum, 2006, supra n 15 at 290. 
37
   Ibid., 290.  
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Figure 1. Human Rights as Capability Rights38 
     
       
   
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
  
Clearly, this trajectory from potential to realized functionings is dependent upon the 
existence of instrumental freedoms, that is, a person’s possibility to interact with and benefit 
from the corresponding social arrangements. Instrumental freedoms create the conditions 
necessary for both the development and the exercise of human functionings and are 
therefore constitutive of certain basic capabilities to which every person is entitled.39 What 
does the capability approach to human rights imply in the context of transitional justice and 
beyond? To examine that question, the article draws on Elizabeth Anderson’s concept of 
democratic equality. 
 
                                                          
38
    Adapted from Ortrud Lessmann and Felix Rauschmayer, ‘Re-Conceptualizing Sustainable Development on 
the Basis of the Capability Approach,’ Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 14(1) (2013): 95–114, fig. 
1. As Ortrud Lessmann and Felix Rauschmayer state, ‘an individual’s capability set comprises all ways of life 
(combinations of functionings) feasible for the person given her embeddedness in the natural and manmade 
system.’ Ibid., 98. 
39
   For a list of such capabilities, see, e.g., Nussbaum, 2011, supra n 15 at 33-34: (1) life; (2) bodily health; (3) 
bodily integrity; (4) senses, imagination and thought; (5) emotions; (6) practical reason; (7) affiliation; (8) [concern 
for] other species; (9) play; (10) control over one’s environment, (a) political, and (b) material. Note that there is 
an ongoing debate concerning the justification of such lists. 
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Capability Rights as Rights to Participatory Capabilities 
Democratic Equality 
Anderson focuses primarily on the ‘capabilities necessary for functioning as an equal 
citizen.’40 She asks, ‘Which capabilities does society have an obligation to equalize?’41 The 
imperative of participation is integral to her conceptualization of equality. Participation is 
significant because of three key qualities. As Jay Drydyk asserts, ‘participation is intrinsically 
valuable insofar as it enhances the participants’ agency.’ 42  Participation also has 
instrumental value in expressing the hearing that people get for their claims (including claims 
of economic needs).43 Finally, participation in public debates can have a constructive role in 
the formation of values and norms (including the conceptualization of needs).44 
To be able to participate in the public sphere and function as an equal citizen 
involves, as Anderson posits, ‘not just the ability effectively to exercise specifically political 
rights but also to participate in the various activities of civil society more broadly, including 
participation in the economy.’ 45  This ‘presupposes functioning as a human being.’ 46 
Consequently, Anderson submits three critical aspects of individual functioning, all 
concerned with the capability to participate, namely functioning ‘as a human being, as a 
participant in a system of cooperative production, and as a citizen of a democratic state.’47 
These aspects encompass the following elements: 
To be capable of functioning as a human being requires effective access to the 
means of sustaining one's biological existence – food, shelter, clothing, medical care 
– and access to the basic conditions of human agency – knowledge of one's 
circumstances and options, the ability to deliberate about means and ends, the 
psychological conditions of autonomy, including the self-confidence to think and 
judge for oneself, freedom of thought and movement. 
                                                          
40
  Elizabeth S. Anderson, ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics 109(2) (1999): 317. 
41
  Ibid., 316. 
42
  Jay Drydyk, 'Democratic Capability' (paper presented at the Fourth International Conference on the 
Capability Approach, Pavia, Italy, 5–7 September 2004), 8. 
43
   Amartya Sen, 'Democracy as Universal Value', Journal of Democracy, 10(3) (1999):10. While Sen 
addresses primarily the value of democracy, it is evident that, for him, democracy and participation in public 
reasoning are inextricably intertwined. 
44
  Ibid.; Sen, 1999, supra n 14 at 148; Drydyk, supra n 42. 
45
   Anderson, supra n 40 at 317. 
46
   Ibid., 317. 
47
  Ibid., 317. 
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 To be capable of functioning as an equal participant in a system of 
cooperative production requires effective access to the means of production, access 
to the education needed to develop one's talents, freedom of occupational choice, 
the right to make contracts and enter into cooperative agreements with others, the 
right to receive fair value for one's labor, and recognition by others of one's 
productive contributions.  
 To be capable of functioning as a citizen requires rights to political 
participation, such as freedom of speech and the franchise, and also effective access 
to the goods and relationships of civil society. ( … ) This also entails the social 
conditions of being accepted by others, such as the ability to appear in public without 
shame, and not being ascribed outcast status.48 
 
Taking South Africa’s apartheid as an example, Figure 2 elucidates the significance 
of the sociopolitical conditions referred to by Anderson, or, in Sen’s terms, instrumental 
freedoms as part of the capability approach to human rights in transitional contexts. Sen’s 
instrumental freedoms correlate with certain legally constituted systems of unfreedom 
revealing the basic structure of apartheid and its negative impact on the participatory 
capabilities of the black majority of South Africans. The resulting violations of political and 
socioeconomic rights are evident. 
                                                          
48
   Ibid., 317-318. Similarly, James Bohman argues that participation is dependent on ‘equality of effective social 
freedom, understood as equal capability for public functioning.’ James Bohman, 'Deliberative Democracy and 
Effective Social Freedom: Capabilities, Resources and Opportunities,’ in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on 
Reason and Politics, ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1997), 322. Accordingly, citizens must be able to develop the ‘capabilities necessary for 
effective deliberation,’ including those ‘that give them effective access to the public sphere.’ Ibid., 323, 333. 
  
Figure 2. Apartheid’s Basic Structure and Its Impact: Deprivation of Participatory Capabilities = Violations of Human Rights  
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Anderson argues that ‘people are entitled to whatever capabilities are necessary to 
enable them to avoid or escape entanglement in oppressive social relationships.’49 She is 
concerned with ‘capabilities required to overcome “oppression” and “exploitation.”’ 50 
Consequently, transitional justice needs to address those capabilities when it comes to 
tackle pretransitional regimes of injustice marked by oppression and exploitation. And 
Anderson’s proposition sets the stage for further examination as she brings into focus what 
is at stake in contexts of transitional justice: the question of agency and its rehabilitation. On 
the premise that law was generally complicit in the creation and maintenance of 
pretransitional injustice, the question of rehabilitation becomes one of law’s own 
rehabilitation, provided transitional justice is indeed concerned with a decisive normative 
shift and effective legal change. What is at stake is nothing less than the (re)construction of 
law’s normative integrity. 
As Ruti Teitel asserts, ‘transitional legality reconstructs rules and conditions of 
political membership, representation, and participation that are basic to the individuals place 
in community.’51 To be effective and meaningful, however, this legal reconfiguration must 
address law’s own contribution to pretransitional injustice. Thus, two related aspects need to 
be distinguished: law’s dysfunctional instrumentality, that is, its complicity in generating 
human rights violations, and the impact or pathology that law’s complicity entailed. 
Accordingly, normative change depends not only ‘on a redefinition of understandings of 
individual status, rights, and duties’52 but also on law’s rehabilitation through the remediation 
of law’s pathology inflicted on victims of human rights violations, including violations of 
socioeconomic rights. 
 
                                                          
49
   Anderson, supra n 40 at 316. 
50
   John M. Alexander, Capabilities and Social Justice: The Political Philosophy of Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 70. 
51
   Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 227. 
52
  Ibid., 227. 
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Agency: From Exclusion to Participation 
To restore law’s normative integrity, it is argued that law needs to instantiate the 
rehabilitation of ‘sufficient agency’ 53  of victims who suffered human rights violations. In 
pretransitional environments, human agency is usually stifled by the abuse of civil-political 
rights and by violations of rights to socioeconomic capabilities. Moreover, given the 
persistence of the pretransitional system’s basic social structure, socioeconomic 
disadvantage is generally hard to escape. The reasons for this are that socioeconomic 
marginalization is often coupled with de iure and de facto political disenfranchisement,54 and 
that patterns of socioeconomic disadvantage tend to perpetuate themselves over 
generations and become even more entrenched and burdensome. 
 As regards the new dispensation, it is therefore submitted, following Kevin Olson, 
that ‘citizens must minimally have the capability to ensure their own agency as citizens.’55 
Sufficient agency implies, as Olson states, that citizens are able ‘to ensure that they do not 
sink into political or cultural invisibility.’56 Having survived violent conflict or an oppressive 
regime, no group should be left at risk of falling again ‘into a downward spiral of political 
marginalization and increasing lack of participatory opportunities.’ 57  The solution Olson 
advances requires that ‘citizens must be able to determine the content of citizenship’:58 
When all citizens can participate to an adequate level, they are able to claim the 
means to political equality. They can articulate rights and policy measures to ensure 
their ongoing agency.59  
 
                                                          
53
  Kevin Olson, Reflexive Democracy: Political Equality and the Welfare State (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press, 2006), 140. This section draws extensively on Olson’s volume. 
54
   See, e.g., Tennessee’s Jim Crow Law in Education (1901), in Civil Rights and African Americans: A 
Documentary History, ed. Albert P. Blaustein and Robert L. Zangrando (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1992),  314-315; see also supra n 3 on discriminatory legislation in Nazi Germany and during South 
Africa’s apartheid regime. 
55
  Olson, supra n 53 at 140. 
56
  Ibid., 140.  
57
  Ibid., 140. 
58
  Ibid., 140. What is at stake is, as Olson notes, that citizens have ‘full capabilities to articulate arguments 
about their own values and institutions.’ Ibid., 150. In a transitional context, however, this criterion may be said to 
correspond to the analogous demand for victims of pretransitional injustice to be able to establish the content of 
injustice.  
59
  Ibid., 140-141. It is noteworthy that equal opportunities to participate have a particular relevance in 
transitional contexts as previously marginalized citizens ‘will be able to raise redistributive claims in the political 
sphere as they see fit.’ Ibid., 17. 
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It is important to keep in mind, however, as Olson notes, that ‘sufficiency and equality are 
deeply intertwined.’60 As he further states, ‘only when agency is both equal and sufficient 
can we claim that participation will enable citizens to sustain the means of their own 
agency.’61 Sufficient and equal agency presupposes participatory capabilities62 that enable 
citizens’ participation.  
 Participatory capabilities can be usefully differentiated with regard to four levels: the 
political level, which corresponds to the terrain of civil and political rights; the institutional 
level, as defined by participatory spaces or structures;63 the procedural level that defines 
forms of participation,64 rules of fairness65 and effective influence66; and the socioeconomic 
conditions associated with the contents of socioeconomic rights. Together with the 
institutional and procedural dimensions of transitional justice, this article focuses primarily on 
participatory capabilities as encompassing the socioeconomic requirements enabling 
participation. This is in line with the essence of the capability approach, which directs ‘our 
attention to what people are actually able to do and to be’,67 including the right to political 
participation.  . 
 As Henry Richardson points out, ‘the basic institutions of society should be arranged 
so as to support the capability of each citizen to engage meaningfully in democratic 
deliberation.’ 68  Economic support and education figure prominently in Richardson’s 
argument.69  
                                                          
60
  Ibid., 141.  
61
  Ibid., 141. 
62
  For the notion of participatory capabilities, see, ibid. 
63
  As Bohman remarks, ‘human diversity flourishes in a well-functioning democracy with a vibrant public sphere 
accessible to all citizens.’ Bohman, supra n 48 at 346. Yet, as Olson argues, promoting the equality of 
participatory capabilities may ‘require levelling structures that amplify the voices of some and diminish the voices 
of others.’ Olson, supra n 53 at 145. 
64
  David A. Crocker, Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), discussing a spectrum of modes of participation, 342-344. 
65
  Henry S. Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002).  
66
  Drydyk, supra n 42, discussing the question of political influence over valuable capabilities. 
67
  Nussbaum, 2006, supra n 15 at 289-290. 
68
  Richardson, supra n 65 at 89. David A. Crocker, 'Sen and Deliberative Democracy,’ in Capabilities Equality: 
Basic Issues and Problems, ed. Alexander Kaufman (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
69
  Richardson, supra n 65 at 88-90. 
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The reluctance of the current transitional justice paradigm to pay attention to the 
socioeconomic dimension risks undermining the democratic project inherent in transition. 
The perpetuation of capability deprivation and disadvantage hinders political and social 
participation and leads effectively to structural exclusion mediated by law. In light of the 
capability perspective, ‘social exclusion [is] seen as the failure of people to have access to 
critical capabilities relating to their integration into society.’70 A formal change of law may 
only provide the formal status of membership to victims who have been marginalized in the 
past, but law per se does not make the formal status effective in a way that would enable 
victims to counter past domination. As Bohman points out,  
The lack of participation in civil society is in this way not merely a matter of 
distributive justice, but of the freedom from domination that comes with the condition 
or status of membership.71 
 
 As for the current transitional justice paradigm, victims of historical injustice are not 
only invisible as structures of exclusion and domination experienced in the past persist, they 
remain ‘invisible as a consequence of the structural features of markets’72 to the extent that 
markets fail to bring about redress by trickle-down benefits. What is the remedy?  
Participatory Capabilities and the Democratic Minimum 
This article advances the capability perspective to reframe transitional justice in such a way 
that it is able to respond to the structured features of pretransitional socioeconomic rights 
violations. Bohman’s account lends support to this view. As he asserts,  
Instead of integrity, respect, or esteem, structural exclusion requires a capabilities-
based approach to freedom in order to provide its diagnosis and remedy. In the same 
way that capabilities cannot be addressed as a matter of the distribution of 
resources, structural exclusion cannot be directly addressed in the categories of 
recognition; domination is a matter of freedom, and capabilities are a matter of 
realizing substantive freedoms and functionings.73 
                                                          
70
   Klasen Stephan, 'Social Exclusion, Children and Education. Implications of a Rights-Based Approach,’ 
European Societies 3(4) (2001): 413. Social exclusion is particularly precarious for children. As Klasen argues, 
‘childhood social exclusion ... has larger negative social effects … People who have suffered from childhood 
social exclusion in education are at risk of being poor and unemployed for longer and more often than others. 
Apart from the exclusionary effects of these problems, they are associated with lower health outcomes, 
decreased access to housing and to food, and poorer access to healthcare.’ Ibid., 437. 
71
   James Bohman, 'Beyond Distributive Justice and Struggles for Recognition: Freedom, Democracy, and 
Critical Theory,’ European Journal of Political Theory 6(3) (2007): 270. 
72
   Ibid., 270. 
73
  Ibid., 271. 
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This view is particularly relevant in transitional contexts where past destitution produced 
disadvantage in the form of unequal starting positions at transition point. As US President 
Lyndon B. Johnson famously said, 
You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate 
him, bring him up to the starting point of a race, and then say, ‘You are free to 
compete with all the others,’ and still justly believe you have been completely fair. 
(…) We seek not just freedom, but opportunity – not just legal equity but human 
ability – not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and as a 
result.74 
 
 What is critical to remedying systemic historical exclusion, according to Bohman, is 
the ‘achievement of a normative status sufficient for citizens to exercise their normative and 
creative powers to reshape democracy according to the demands of justice.’75 Bohman calls 
this normative status the ‘democratic minimum,’ which requires ‘achieving a fundamental 
threshold of freedoms and the powers that they entail.’76 Importantly, Bohman cautions,  
The purpose of the conception of the democratic minimum is thus not to describe the 
ideal conditions of full parity; rather it is to describe the necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for democratic arrangements to be a means to realize justice under 
nonideal conditions.77 
 
 As he asserts, ‘the obvious place to begin developing the democratic minimum is in 
terms of the republican account of those human rights that contribute to having the status of 
a free citizen.’78 More specifically, as Bohman notes, ‘the mere absence of tyranny does not 
reach the democratic threshold’ as it is ‘insufficient to establish the potential reflexivity about 
normative powers that is necessary for rectifying injustice.’79 For Bohman, it is the ‘ability to 
begin, to initiate deliberation’ that ‘provides the basis measure for the normative status of 
persons required for the democratic minimum.’ 80  Thus, he points to the capabilities 
necessary for participatory agency. As this article suggests, participatory agency is, inter 
                                                          
74
   Lyndon B. Johnson, 'Commencement Address at Howard University: “To Fulfill These Rights,” June 4, 1965,’ 
in Civil Rights and African Americans: A Documentary History, supra n 54 at . 560-561. , .  
75
   Bohman, supra n 71 at 270-271. 
76
   Ibid., 271. Significantly, this view reflects the description of capabilities in Olson, supra n 53. 
77
   Bohman, supra n 71 at 272. 
78
   Ibid., 273. 
79
   Ibid., 273. 
80
   Ibid., 273-274. 
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alia, dependent on the rights to socioeconomic capabilities such as the ability to find work, to 
become educated and to lead a healthy life of normal length.81 Therefore, transitional justice 
has to respond to the corresponding capability deprivation in pretransitional contexts. As 
Bohman succinctly argues, ‘the forms of extreme destitution, historical injustice, and social 
exclusion … create conditions of capability failure that are functionally equivalent to tyranny 
and the absence of political rights.’82 
    As legal systems prevailing in the past generally played a negative role by 
contributing to capability deprivation, any transitional justice response has to start with the 
law. The goal of transitional justice must be the restoration and, hence, the instantiation of 
substantial freedom in terms of capabilities to social, economic and political participation. 
Consequently, freedom will be, in the words of Bohman, ‘a freedom through mutual 
accountability mediated through norms.’83  
  Given the inherent nexus between the political and the economic sphere, between 
participation and material inequality,84 the rights to socioeconomic capabilities such as those 
related to work, health and education, for instance, may in fact be considered rights to 
participatory capabilities. 85  Claims for redress of socioeconomic capability rights violations 
represent simultaneously claims to redress in their own right as well as claims to the equalization 
of socioeconomic capabilities in order to enable effective participation. As a result, transitional 
law needs to be concerned not only with levelling the playing field in the future but also laying the 
groundwork for levelling the playing field at the transition point. This requirement is justified as 
the emerging, reconfigured polity derives its democratic legitimacy from the instantiation of equal 
opportunities for victims of pretransitional injustice, enabling them to participate not only in 
                                                          
81
   As Nussbaum contends, ‘it is very difficult to participate in political life on a basis of equality with others, or to 
enjoy the freedom of speech, if one has not had access to basic health care, or the opportunity for a decent 
education.’ Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” against Lofty Formalism,’ Harvard 
Law Review 121(4) (2007): 23. 
82
  Bohman, supra n 71 at 274. For historical examples, see the transitions in South Africa, Guatemala or East 
Timor. Significantly, the prevailing legal systems at the time generally played a negative role in these cases by 
contributing to capability deprivation. 
83
  Bohman, supra n 71 at 269. 
84
  Olson, supra n 53.  
85
  Compare Olson, who states, ‘Agency should be seen as a matter of capabilities evaluated from political, 
cultural, and economic perspectives.’ Ibid., 207.  
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transitional justice mechanisms but also in the formulation of ‘norms, laws, and policies under 
which they live.’ 86  It is in these two ways – formal legal change, on the one hand, and 
substantive and sustainable rehabilitation of victims’ capabilities, on the other87 – that law is 
mandated to operate a normative shift in transition.  
 
Rethinking Transitional Justice 
Legitimacy through Transitional Justice 
The basic axis of the architecture of transitional justice is the normative shift to legitimate law 
with the rehabilitation of participatory capabilities as a key element allowing the new state to 
create the conditions of its own legitimacy. The normative shift is usefully conceived as the 
founding act of the transition88 and at the same time constitutive of the new dispensation. 
Thus, the transitional legal response initiates the normative shift to legitimate law. As Teitel 
notes, ‘at some level, one might say that the legal responses create transition.’89 However, 
while the ‘legacies of injustice have a bearing on what is deemed transformative,’ 90 
standards of transitional law and its inclusiveness determine in turn both law’s ability to 
respond to that legacy and the degree of legitimacy it is able to generate. First, this implies 
the application of ‘uncompromised’ sources of law, typically the use of international 
standards such as international human rights 91  but also the inclusion of victims of 
socioeconomic rights as the constituency of this founding act of justice, which is the 
                                                          
86
  Ibid., 209. 
87
  The notion of ‘sustainable’ rehabilitation refers to the necessary structural change without which even 
rehabilitated victims would remain vulnerable to further or renewed violations of their socioeconomic rights. In 
other words, structural change is considered the conditio sine qua non to address root causes of human rights 
violations and prevent their recurrence. 
88
  Ruti Teitel calls the normative shift ‘transitions’ defining feature.’ Teitel, supra n 51 at 215. Moreover, the 
normative shift can be conceived as possibly spread out in multiple enactments of a diverse nature. As Teitel 
notes, ‘Transitional operative acts include pronouncements of indictments and verdicts; the issuing of amnesties, 
reparations, and apologies; and the promulgation of constitutions and reports...’ Ibid., 220. 
89
  Ruti G. Teitel, 'Transitional Rule of Law,' in Rethinking the Rule of Law after Communism, ed. Adam 
Czarnota, Martin Krygier and Wojciech Sadurski (New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 280. 
90
  Ibid., 280. 
91
   A cautionary note might be needed here, however. As Mutua asserts regarding Africa, ‘to be of utility to 
Africa, and fundamentally transform the continent’s dire fortunes, human rights must address economic 
powerlessness and the scandalous international order.’ Mutua, supra n 4 at 37.  
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normative shift, albeit with multiple enactments.92 The normative shift becomes the locus of 
justice aptly captured by Emmanuel Levinas:  
The original locus of justice [is] a terrain common to me and the others where I am 
counted among them, that is, where subjectivity is a citizen with all the duties and 
rights measured and measurable.93 
 
 Second, it is not sufficient to apply legal standards only formally or make only formal 
provision for the inclusion of victims. The crucial link between changing legal norms and 
enabling the participation of victims are victims’ capabilities and, in particular, their rights to 
participatory capabilities. This is so because participation depends on material preconditions, 
and it is law’s task to make provision to guarantee those conditions, not least because 
people’s participation in authoring laws is predicated on them. As Olson asserts, ‘a legal 
system must attempt to ensure the conditions necessary of its own legitimacy.’ 94  This 
requirement in turn implies that ‘a system of laws must include a guarantee of agency 
sufficient to ensure that people will be able to function as equal participants in authoring 
law.’95 
 It is in this respect that transitional law has largely failed in the past,96 a failure that 
left its mark on people’s ability to participate in social life, in the economy or in the public 
sphere, including the making or authorizing of laws. Thus, in order to enable people to 
participate again, or for the very first time, participatory capabilities are to be rehabilitated 
and conditions must be created for their sustainability. 97  Accordingly, law can be 
rehabilitated as its enabling function is restored via the rehabilitation of participatory 
                                                          
92
  For the use of the concept of constituency in the ‘transitional’ context of Australian Aboriginals, see, 
Raimond Gaita, A Common Humanity (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1999). 
93
   Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1981), 160. 
94
   Olson, supra n 53 at 187. 
95
   Ibid., 203. 
96
  See, e.g., three critical decisions of the highest courts in the land, namely Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954) in the US, Mabo v. State of Queensland (No. 2) (1992) in Australia and Government of South Africa v. 
Grootboom and Others (2000) in South Africa. While these judgments reflect change in legal thought, their real 
impact in terms of the structural changes required has been limited. For the limitations of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, see, e.g., Mahmood Mamdani, 'The Truth According to the TRC,’ in The Politics of 
Memory: Truth, Healing, and Social Justice, ed. Ifi Amadiume and Abdullahi An-Na'im (London: Zed Books, 
2000). 
97
   It is on this basis, as Olson affirms, that people ‘can articulate rights and policy measures to ensure their 
ongoing agency.’ In this way, citizens will acquire ‘the means to prevent their own marginalization.’ Olson, supra 
n 53 at 141.  
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capabilities. The extent to which law is successful in that respect demonstrates the degree of 
legitimation of the new dispensation.98 Thus, the normative shift ties together the formal 
change of law, what may be called its trans-normation, and its substantive impact, that is, 
the actual trans-formation evidenced in victim’s lives and reflected in the recovery of 
participatory capabilities. Such a recovery has its challenges, however, as the harm inflicted 
reveals a complex aetiology, explored below. 
 
Corrosive Disadvantage 
Law’s pathology can lead to capability deprivation in diverse areas of life, such as education, 
health or work, either at the same time or across time. The deficits concerning distinct 
participatory capabilities may interact synchronically or diachronically and produce ‘multiple, 
severe disadvantage.’99 Consequently, the transitional justice response becomes even more 
urgent when it comes to addressing disadvantage. 
Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit usefully propose what can be called a ‘dynamic 
view’ of capabilities. They distinguish three forms of disadvantage: clustering, dynamic 
clustering and corrosive disadvantage.100 ‘Clustering’ is understood as the accumulation of 
disadvantage over time. With ‘dynamic clustering,’ they identify the two cases ‘where a 
person “accumulates” disadvantages over time, and the reproduction of disadvantage over 
generations.’101  
 At the heart of these forms of disadvantage is capability deprivation, that is, ‘poor or 
insecure functionings’102 where societies’ ‘instrumental freedoms have not been allowed to 
develop and exercise sufficient levels of functionings. Insufficient functionings build up 
‘corrosive disadvantage,’ which is understood as the ‘sort of disadvantage that has negative 
                                                          
98
   Olson points out that to be democratically legitimate a democratic state must provide ‘its citizens with equal 
opportunities to formulate the norms, laws, and policies under which they live.’ Ibid., 209. 
99
  Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit, ‘On Fertile Functionings: A Response to Martha Nussbaum,’ Journal of 
Human Development and Capabilities 14(1) (2013): 161. 
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   Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit, Disadvantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 120-121. 
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102
    Ibid., 121. 
____________________________________________________Enabling Transitional Justice      |     21 
                                   
 
effects on other functionings.’103 Corrosive disadvantage becomes particularly harmful in 
combination with dynamic clustering. Multiple and accumulated disadvantage in parents can 
cause harm for children and disadvantage once they grow up.104  
 This raises the question ‘Which functionings are relevant here?’ Wolff and De-Shalit 
have identified six ‘core’ functionings: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, affiliation, control 
over the environment and sense, imagination and thought.105 Significantly, some of these 
functionings are directly related to the rights to certain socioeconomic capabilities. Sense, 
imagination and thought are informed by and connected to the capability right to be 
educated. Life, bodily health and bodily integrity concern the human right to the capability to 
have good health and lead a life of normal length. Control over one’s environment includes 
control over one’s work, including the human right to the capability to seek and find 
employment.   As Richard Wilkinson and Michael Marmot point out, ‘evidence from a number 
of countries shows that, even after allowing for other factors, unemployed people and their 
families suffer a substantially increased risk of premature death.’106 Clearly, not being able to 
work proves to be corrosive for the health capability. The notion of corrosive functionings 
and corrosive disadvantage is able to elucidate that correlation powerfully.  
 Accordingly, it is critical for societies’ political and biological well-being to examine 
violations of socioeconomic rights in transitional contexts. Moreover, it is the interconnection 
in the present and over time through corrosive dynamic clustering that confronts transitional 
societies with deadly consequences if not addressed – potentially decreasing human 
flourishing in the present and leading to premature death in the future. This would be a tragic 
outcome for the victims who were deprived of their capabilities either by deliberate legal 
engineering or neglect and omission. It is the task of transitional justice to begin with 
reversing corrosive capability deprivation and multiple disadvantage. A normative shift by 
                                                          
103
    Ibid., 121. 
104
    Wolff and De-Shalit cite research from the US which highlights that ‘parents who worked at night were 2.7 
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formal change of law alone remains meaningless if it is unable to instantiate the restoration 
of socioeconomic capabilities, the foundation for the exercise of equal citizenship. Critical in 
this context is the interdependent nature of political equality, which will be examined next. 
 
Capabilities and Political Equality 
The capability perspective undercuts mainstream transitional justice, which appears to 
assume the insulation of political equality from other domains of the societal structure. 
Instead, Sen stresses the ‘extensive interconnections between political freedoms and the 
understanding and fulfilment of economic needs.’107 Sen’s concept of instrumental freedoms 
– political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and 
protective security – points to the extensively heterogeneous nature of political equality. As 
Sen notes, ‘These instrumental freedoms directly enhance the capabilities of people, but 
they also supplement one another, and can furthermore reinforce each other.’108 In addition, 
they can work as what may be called detrimental unfreedoms and thus produce or 
perpetuate, for example, political inequality. Consequently, it can be argued that the 
capability rights perspective expresses the interdependence of political equality and 
socioeconomic equality. Guillermo O’Donnell, for instance, points to the link that ‘runs from 
an inegalitarian socio-economic structure to the weakness of political and, especially, civil 
rights.’109 He notes that ‘deep inequality and its usual concomitant of widespread and severe 
poverty’ entail ‘the dramatic curtailment of capabilities.’ 110  As a result, those whose 
socioeconomic rights have been violated in pretransitional contexts without being offered 
                                                          
107
   Sen, 1999, supra n 14 at 147. 
108
  Ibid., 40. 
109
   Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America: A Partial Conclusion,’ in The 
(Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America, ed. Juan E. Méndez, Guillermo O'Donnell and Paulo 
Sérgio Pinheiro (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 322. 
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redress will find their capacity ‘to control public decision-making and to ensure policy 
outcomes’ significantly reduced.111 
Edward Muller’s study corroborates the negative impact of income inequality on 
democratization, especially if not addressed by transitional justice.112 As Muller insists, ‘the 
prospect for long-term consolidation of democracy is poor in countries where highly 
inegalitarian income distributions prevail.’113 Similarly, Gabriel de la Paz demonstrates ‘a 
clear positive correlation between social inequality and civil and political rights.’ 114  In 
particular, he emphasizes that the causal nexus goes from social inequality to democracy 
and not in the reverse direction.115 This perspective is supported by the findings of Adam 
Przeworski and colleagues, who assert that  
it appears that democracies are less stable in societies that are more unequal to 
begin with, in societies in which household income inequality increases, and in 
societies in which labor receives a lower share of value added in manufacturing.116  
 
An assessment of the empirical literature by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson points in 
the same direction, namely that democracies seem to have a better chance to survive in less 
unequal societies.117 
To conclude, the research discussed underscores that conceptualizations 
concentrating only on political or legal processes while excluding the socioeconomic 
dimension are insufficient as they provide only partial answers. Furthermore, the research 
presented challenges current transitional justice assumptions, according to which 
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   Steven Friedman, 'Democracy, Inequality, and the Reconstitution of Politics,’ in Democratic Governance 
and Social Inequality, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin and Amelia Brown (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 14. 
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 Edward N. Muller, 'Economic Determinants of Democracy,’ American Sociological Review 60(6) (1995): 966-
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    Ibid., 981. 
114
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‘democratization of institutions precedes the democratization of society,’118 where ‘civil and 
political rights appear as prior to social economic and social rights,’ 119  and where the 
transition to democracy ‘is cast independent of changes in the organization of economic 
life.’ 120  Conversely, the research available confirms the capability rights perspective 
advanced here, which holds that the political and the economic sphere are profoundly 
interconnected, an insight that cannot be neglected when rethinking transitional justice in 
terms of the recovery of victims’ capability rights. 
 
Towards a New Architecture of Transitional Justice 
This article attempts to show that the whole spectrum of human rights via the capability 
rights perspective can and needs to be part of the transitional justice framework, enabling it 
to respond comprehensively to historical injustice. The underlying new conceptualization of 
the normative shift is crucial in that regard. How can law lay claim to change if it is excluding 
a priori one potential dimension of pretransitional injustice?  
 
Evolving Normative Integrity  
The conditio sine qua non of the normative shift is law’s responsiveness, that is, its ability to 
respond to previous injustice. Transitional justice is contingent upon its response to all forms 
of injustice, including the repair of harm produced by previous regimes. Consequently, to the 
extent that law is able to respond to prior injustice it is able to perform the required normative 
shift from Unrechtsstaat to Rechsstaat, from the un-rule of illegitimate law to the rule of 
legitimate law. As domestic law was compromised in the past, the normative shift is 
rendered possible via external standards such as international human rights law.121  
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  Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 71.  
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    Ibid., 71-72. 
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in Political Transformation,’ Yale Law Journal 106 (1997): 2009-2080; Teitel, supra n 51. 
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A normative shift is able to contribute genuinely to the legitimacy of the new dispensation 
provided socioeconomic rights form part of these external standards. The conceptualization 
of human rights as capability rights derived from the capability approach demonstrates the 
indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights, in particular of civil-political rights and 
socioeconomic rights.  
 
Responding to Structural Exclusion 
The reconceptualization of transitional justice proposed here takes up law’s challenge in 
transition to embody a fundamental responsiveness to pretransitional injustice, particularly in 
terms of violations of socioeconomic rights. As Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick assert, 
‘responsive law aims at enablement and facilitation.’122 Enablement and facilitation cannot 
be thought of as independent of socioeconomic needs. Otherwise, law, that is, genuinely 
responsive law, will not be able to (re)construct and sustain a ‘political community that is 
inclusive, not the property of a few.’123 As the capability rights perspective involves both an 
‘agent-rooted’ and a structural-institutional dimension, it is well suited to instantiate the 
fundamental structural changes needed to overcome the vicious cycle of injustice marked by 
powerlessness. Without this new framework, structural exclusion and its consequences 
persist and threaten the democratic viability of the new polity as the victims of violations of 
socioeconomic rights remain deprived of their capabilities, unable to participate as equal 
citizens in social life, in the labour market and in the public sphere. 
 
Principles of Transformative Justice  
People whose socioeconomic rights have been violated have claims of justice,124 claims that 
address pretransitional legacies of deprived agency and socioeconomic exclusion. Five 
                                                          
122
   Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001 [1978]), 111. 
123
   Ibid., 117-118. 
124
   As John Alexander points out, ‘when the capability shortfalls and deprivation that people face are things that 
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50 at 170. 
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transitional justice principles based on the capability approach are submitted to fulfil this 
task, informing the justice claims of victims while providing guidance for an institutional 
response apt to deliver transitional justice. 
 The first two principles are foundational and inform the other three principles. The 
two foundational principles are the principle of sufficient and equal agency, understood in 
terms of capabilities,125 and the principle of inclusive participation.126 Both principles reflect 
what John Alexander calls ‘the “agency” and “participation” route,’ considering it ‘most often 
the proven way to enhance people’s well-being.’127 Based on recognition of the ‘inherent 
connection between participation and material inequality,’128 the principles are intertwined as 
articulated in the notion of ‘participatory capabilities.’129 They both have a distinct transitional 
justice task: the principle of sufficient and equal agency secures the enablement of victims to 
counter deprived agency and initial comparative disadvantage, and the principle of inclusive 
participation advances the increasing participation of those previously excluded to raise their 
voices and to be heard.  
These two principles ground and inform the other three operative principles: the 
principle of nonselective factual acknowledgement of pretransitional injustice as a basis for 
responsive and cooperative change; the principle of legislation to incorporate formal legal 
change; and the principle of transformation, focusing on individual and collective redress as 
well as on structural transformation to make redress durable and sustainable. Ultimately, 
genuine transitional justice is transformative justice. Following Robert Alexy, these principles 
may be seen as ‘optimisation requirements,’130 furthering the transformation underway. 
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   The proposition of this principle builds primarily on Olson, supra n 53. For the concept of agency generally 
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   For the underlying notion of deliberative participation, see, David A. Crocker, 'Deliberative Participation in 
Local Development,’ Journal of Human Development 8(3) (2007): 431-455. 
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 A society concerned for those who suffered especially from violations of 
socioeconomic rights should demonstrate a strong commitment to these five transitional 
justice principles as a basis for collective responsibility in order to address the legacy of the 
past and to ground a democratic future. As Charles Taylor notes, ‘democracies are path 
dependent; the founding transitions they undergo mark their future.’131   
 
Enabling Transformative Justice 
Law’s pathology and its corrosive legacy, if not addressed, put the required normative shift in 
peril. In fact, this article suggests that a twofold rehabilitation is necessary: the rehabilitation 
of law in tandem with the rehabilitation of victims’ capabilities. Both together empower 
victims in order to prevent the recurrence of deprivation effectively (e.g., via truth 
commissions and public debate). However, the possibility of political participation also has its 
material preconditions. This perspective is reflected in the concept of capability rights, for 
instance, the right to the capabilities of being able to find work, of becoming educated and of 
being able to live a healthy life of normal length. These socioeconomic capabilities have 
been shown to embody critical participatory capabilities. The recovery of participatory 
capabilities stands ultimately for the rehabilitation of victims as persons in freedom. Provided 
transitional law offers a process allowing victims of historical injustice to achieve sufficient 
and equal agency, victims have the opportunity to regain their agency as rights bearers, their 
rights subjectivity.132 At the same time, transitional responsiveness needs to be attentive to 
the urgency of these claims of justice due to the corrosiveness of disadvantage and 
structural deprivation. These enduring harms demand structural change based on an 
investigation of historical, political and economic constraints on capabilities and the resulting 
capability deprivation. Without such transformation, new laws will ‘largely codify these 
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constraints’133 and sustain the inherited socioeconomic injustice. It is important to bear in 
mind that effective participation in transitional justice mechanisms paves the way to equal 
participation in the new dispensation. 
 
Transition and Beyond: Diagnosis and Transformation, Measuring and Monitoring 
How might the instantiation of participatory transitional justice processes that aim at 
achieving equal and sufficient agency and at transforming the entrenched structural 
impediments blocking the way to such empowerment look? Such participatory processes 
would need to tackle both diagnosis and therapy of pretransitional injustice. That is to say, 
violations of rights to socioeconomic capabilities need to be identified, as well as measures 
of repair. 
Diagnostic fora for participation may include public hearings and truth commissions 
with a primary focus on socioeconomic rights violations and their victims. Diagnostic fora 
should also be able to draw on experts as part of an epistemic community realizing this 
holistic and transformative paradigm of transitional justice.134 Transformative fora, in turn, 
might draw on examples such as Brazilian experiences with public budgeting.135 Decisions 
taken in such fora to advance socioeconomic transformation would also require appropriate 
institutions to monitor the implementation of such decisions, for example, national human 
rights commissions or other institutions dedicated to auditing the transformation. 136 
Moreover, the monitoring of public finances from a human rights perspective could be 
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considered.137 All these fora would need to provide institutional space to enable civil society, 
and victims in particular, to participate. 
Not only for the diagnosis itself but also for the corresponding transformative 
measures and the related monitoring procedures, the appropriate measurement will be 
critical when participatory fora assess violations of socioeconomic capabilities. The capability 
approach itself has been tested and served as a diagnostic tool.138 The development of 
human rights measurement at UN level should prove useful in this regard, because of what 
may be called ‘the emergence of convergence’ between the capability approach to human 
rights and the method of human rights measurement promoted by the UN.139  
 
The Challenge: Conditions of Inequality 
Nonetheless, all these fora and procedures are contingent upon the conditions of 
socioeconomic inequality and the asymmetries of the inherited configuration of political 
power. These conditions need to be addressed, as they could hamper the exercise of public 
reasoning. As Henry Richardson asserts,  
the process of democratic debate and decision must itself be structured so as to 
allow each person a fair chance to participate and to counteract to a degree the 
political influence of disparities in economic and political power.140  
 
To overcome the structural inequality in deliberations, Séverine Deneulin usefully 
advances four procedural requirements: priority, nonarbitrariness, ethical efficiency and 
noncompensation.141 According to the requirement of priority, ‘one should give priority to 
promoting the well-being of those who are below a threshold level of functioning [or 
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capability].’142 Nonarbitrariness would require that when deliberating and making decisions, 
‘one should not favour arbitrarily the promotion of one functioning [or capability].’ 143 
Following the requirement of ethical efficiency, one would ‘seek to choose, if available, the 
means which will promote several components of human well-being [or capabilities] at the 
same time rather than a single one.’144 Finally, the requirement of noncompensation would 
entail ‘that worsening of one component of human well-being [or capability] cannot 
compensate for an improvement of another.’145 These requirements represent a promising 
approach to complement the collaborative process of public reasoning in contexts of 
transitional justice.  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, the more a transitional society invests in restoring and expanding participatory 
capabilities that constrained victims of past injustice, the more a society is able to respond 
ever more adequately to past injustice and overcome its consequences in the present. 
Former victims will not only be able to participate in transitional justice mechanisms but also 
be empowered to function as equal citizens as transitional justice instantiates structural 
transformation, thereby building the foundations of a common future. Thus, to use a phrase 
advanced by Jürgen Habermas, the new architecture of transitional justice will be able to 
transform unjust structures and reconstitute ‘social solidarity preserved in legal structures.’146  
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